South Asia under Siege: LTTE Narco-Networks to Rising Islamist Extremism

In May 2009, Sri Lanka achieved a historic victory: the military defeat of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), ending decades of terror, death, and disruption. The heroic war heroes eliminated one of the most sophisticated terrorist movements of modern times. Yet, as history has repeatedly shown, defeating an armed force does not eliminate the threat it leaves behind. Sri Lanka’s decision makers erred in not identifying the scope of the threat & the players involved.
Today, fifteen years later, the shadow of the LTTE continues to loom—not on the battlefields of Sri Lanka, but in the boardrooms, seaports, and digital corridors of the global diaspora. These networks, originally designed to fund, supply, and propagate LTTE operations, have not disappeared. They quietly continue to operate in Europe, North America, Australia, and Southeast Asia. Through fundraising, lobbying, and maintaining logistical channels to accrue profits for themselves, have kept alive the template of transnational terror, long after their weapons fell silent.
What has remained largely unexamined is that the LTTE did not operate as an isolated ethnic militant movement. It was an externally enabled proxy force that served the geopolitical needs of several competing powers. Now, the same external actors are quietly repurposing parts of the old LTTE machinery toward new destabilisation objectives across South Asia.
The handlers have changed the puppets, not the theatre
But there is a more dangerous evolution afoot. Across South Asia, recent bombings in Pakistan and India reveal a rapidly growing nexus between extremist groups and organized crime, particularly narcotics trafficking. Islamist extremist networks—ISIS-K, TTP affiliates, and local cells—are expanding their footprint, exploiting the very maritime routes, smuggling corridors, and financial channels that were once pioneered by the LTTE.
They all have a common understanding & probably common handlers too.
With the LTTE’s battlefield defeat, foreign actors have shifted attention to Islamist extremist networks as the next useful instrument.
The Easter Sunday attack was a message of what’s to come.
The Church erred in not identifying the playing ground & the message before forgiving the assassins and diverting blame elsewhere which enabled the perpetrators to buy time.
These groups now occupy the same strategic corridors the LTTE once dominated—maritime lanes, smuggling lines, forged documentation routes, and narcotics trails. What failed in ethnic militancy is being reattempted through religious extremism.
What remains largely unspoken is the role of foreign intelligence networks in sustaining these ecosystems. The LTTE’s global footprint did not survive by accident; it survived because it remained useful. Sri Lanka’s Armed Forces could have easily eliminated LTTE without terror lasting 3 decades. However, the LTTE bogey was needed for other reasons. Tamils were the guinea pigs just as were all victims of terror.
Today, the same actors who once found utility in LTTE logistics now find new value in Islamist cells seeking maritime mobility, forged documentation, political cover, and narcotics-based financing. The Indian Ocean is no longer merely a smuggling zone—it is a geopolitical chessboard. Until Colombo recognizes the external hands that kept these networks alive, dismantling the crime-terror nexus will remain impossible. Terrorism did not evolve alone; it evolved because someone wanted it to. Unfortunately, those at the helm and tasked to monitor & read the writings on the wall chose not to adopt counter measures to protect the sovereignty of Sri Lanka.
The patterns are alarming:
- Shared smuggling routes:The LTTE once controlled maritime passages from Karachi to Gujarat and down to Tamil Nadu, transporting arms, drugs, and people. Today, these same routes are used by Islamist extremists for explosives, operatives, and illicit funding.
- Narco-terror financing:The LTTE perfected the model of using narcotics trafficking to fund terror operations decades ago. Modern extremists now use similar structures, combining drug money with diaspora donations and front organizations.
- Diaspora influence and lobbying:LTTE diaspora networks mastered the art of influencing foreign governments, media, and NGOs to shape global narratives. Islamist extremists are now adopting the same playbook, leveraging legal loopholes, political sympathies, and charities to secure legitimacy while quietly funding radical operations. One cannot overlook the entities that speak for both.
For decades, one fact remained curiously ignored: LTTE smuggling corridors and Islamist trafficking routes operated side-by-side without ever clashing.
This ‘non-aggression’ arrangement was not organic. It reflected a broader regional underworld system—where drug bosses, arms brokers, and foreign handlers ensured that each group operated in designated zones. Such coordination does not happen without powerful mediators and protectors.
Beyond financing and logistics lies an even graver concern: demographic expansionist strategies. Radical Islamist networks increasingly promote population consolidation in key regions, using higher birth rates, migration, and control over educational and religious institutions to create “pockets of influence.”
The UN does not help matters either. Its core bodies while supporting birth control in select regions are promoting birth support where expansionist agendas are taking place. Is this a coincidence or planned?
The greater danger is convergence.
LTTE diaspora logistics, Islamist ideological networks, South Indian underworld operations, and Pakistani narco groups are no longer isolated entities. They are evolving into a hybrid ecosystem—one supplying money, one providing numbers, one offering political cover abroad, one managing maritime channels.
This fusion is the perfect architecture for a new generation of transnational extremism.
When combined with smuggling networks, financial channels, and ideological propagation, the risk escalates from isolated terror acts to sustained regional destabilization. Fermenting ghettos that foster and fume discord rarely leaves people in unity.
The LTTE diaspora and its narco-terror legacy have inadvertently enabled this new generation of threats. The expertise, logistics, and transnational connectivity built over decades of insurgency now provide a template for others—groups with even wider demographic bases, global funding networks, and a transnational ideology. The LTTE diaspora is pulling all its trumps simply to keep its kitty going for the kitty operators themselves.
Sri Lanka’s vulnerability has increased—not because the threats are stronger, but because the nation’s internal defences have been deliberately weakened and following appeasement mentality. Intelligence agencies have been fragmented, anti-terror laws diluted and demoralized, NGO influence expanded, and security policy increasingly outsourced to foreign advisers with conflicting agendas while another set have been tasked to spread and promote bizarre narratives via social media and even amongst decision makers. Meanwhile, radical cells re-activate under humanitarian fronts, demographic consolidation accelerates in sensitive districts, and political parties open doors to external funding. We are becoming a soft target by choice, not by fate.
Sri Lanka, and indeed all of South Asia, faces a warning that cannot be ignored:
Defeating a terrorist group does not neutralize the network, nor the infrastructure that sustained it.
On the other hand, the rise of Islamist extremist cells exploiting these same channels is proof that the war has simply changed shape. Moreover, with internal networks weakened or neutralized, outsourcing sovereignty and national security to a neighboring nation is certainly not the answer.
It is time for concerned parties—governments, security agencies, and informed citizens—to open their eyes. The same networks that once terrorized Sri Lanka can now fuel instability across South Asia. Ignoring the legacy of the LTTE’s global operations is no longer an option. Strategic vigilance, intelligence cooperation, and a firm understanding of the crime-terror nexus are critical. Those who fail to see the links between the past and the present may soon face the consequences of history repeating itself.
The ultimate objective of those behind the LTTE was not Tamil liberation—it was leverage over Sri Lanka. A fragmented, unstable island gives external powers control over sea lanes, intelligence staging points, economic concessions, and political compliance. The proxy may change, but the strategic intention remains constant.
But the shift now underway is far more dangerous. Unlike the LTTE, which was externally sustained and internally rejected by most Tamils, the Islamist expansionist agenda is demographic, ideological, and generational. Once embedded, it cannot be switched off or reversed. External powers may see it as a new proxy, but the endgame of Islamist demographic consolidation is not negotiable, not containable, and not reversible once it crosses critical mass. The proxy may change, but the strategic intentions—and the danger—are exponentially greater this time.
The lesson is clear: terrorist networks do not vanish—they evolve. And evolution without scrutiny is a threat waiting to explode.
Sri Lanka bled for three decades to defeat one of the deadliest terrorist movements on earth. Today, we risk sleepwalking into its return not for a single cause—this time through new faces, new ideologies, and revived networks hidden behind NGOs, demographic shifts, and transnational funding and using ethno-religious themes as a front & camouflage. None of those representing either ethnic groups or religious groups have any say or control over these entities as they previously did.
We cannot afford to forget the price we paid.
The war may have ended in 2009, but the threat never did and never will unless all Sri Lankans wake up to ground realities brewing under their very noses.
Shenali D Waduge
